History	Mathematical preliminaries	Security of RSA	Implementation of RSA
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Overview of the RSA cryptosystem

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MIT PRIMES Conference

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Outline

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- 2 Mathematical preliminaries
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• Early cryptography: private key. (Caesar cipher)

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History				

- Early cryptography: private key. (Caesar cipher)
- Modern cryptography: public key.

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History

- Early cryptography: private key. (Caesar cipher)
- Modern cryptography: public key.
- The RSA cryptosystem, was named after Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman, who first publicly described it in 1977.

Mathematical preliminaries

Modular arithmetic

Euler totient and Euler's theorem

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Modular arithmetic

Congruence modulo m

Integers a and b are congruent modulo m if m divides their difference a - b. We denote it as $a \equiv b \pmod{m}$

Greatest common divisor

The greatest common divisor of integers a and b, denoted gcd(a, b), is the largest integer that divides both a and b.

Multiplicative inverse

An integer b is the multiplicative inverse of a modulo m if:

 $ab \equiv 1 \pmod{m}$

This exists if and only if gcd(a, m) = 1.

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Euler's totient function

Euler's totient function $\phi(n)$

Counts the number of integers up to n that are relatively prime to n

$$\phi(n) = \#\{m \in \mathbb{N} : 1 \le m < n \text{ and } gcd(m, n) = 1\}$$

Examples of $\phi(n)$ n $\phi(n)$

Properties of $\phi(n)$

- If p is a prime number: $\phi(p) = p 1$.
- If a and b are coprime: $\phi(ab) = \phi(a)\phi(b)$.

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Special cases used in RSA

Theorem (Euler)

If N and m are coprime, then

 $m^{\phi(N)} \equiv 1 \pmod{N},$

This theorem generalizes Fermat's little theorem, providing a fundamental reduction method for large powers in modular arithmetic.

Special cases used in RSA

• N = pq with p and q primes.

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$$\phi(N) = \phi(pq) = \phi(p)\phi(q) = (p-1)(q-1).$$

• $m^{(p-1)(q-1)} \equiv 1 \pmod{N}$.

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Outline of the RSA algorithm

Alice	Eve	Bob
	Key Creation	
	N and e published.	Choose large primes p , q , and compute $N = p \cdot q$. Choose e , with gcd(e, (p - 1)(q - 1)) = 1.
	Encryption	
Create plaintext <i>m</i> . Use known key (N, e) to compute $c \equiv m^e \pmod{N}$. Send ciphertext <i>c</i> to Bob.	Insecure ciphertext <i>c</i> .	
	Decryption	
		Compute d satisfying $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$. Compute $c^d \pmod{N}$: $c^d \equiv m^{de}$ $\equiv m^{k(p-1)(q-1)+1}$ $\equiv m \pmod{N}$.

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- Security foundation
- Common uses of RSA
- Considerations for quantum computing

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Basic security foundation of RSA

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Basic security foundation of RSA

Problem 1: integer factorization

Given an integer N promised to be a product of two large primes p and q, find p and q.



Basic security foundation of RSA

Problem 1: integer factorization

Given an integer N promised to be a product of two large primes p and q, find p and q.

- No known efficient (polynomial time) algorithm with classical computers.
- Hard to obtain the decryption exponent *d* from published public key *N* alone.

Basic security foundation of RSA

Problem 1: integer factorization

Given an integer N promised to be a product of two large primes p and q, find p and q.

- No known efficient (polynomial time) algorithm with classical computers.
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Problem 2: RSA

Given e, c and N, also with this equation known, find the value of x.

 $x^e \equiv c \pmod{N},$

The security of the RSA relied on the assumption that it is hard to compute the *e* th roots modulo *N*.

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Basic security foundation of RSA

Theorem

If the Problem 1 (integer factorization) is solved, Problem 2 (RSA) can also be solved.

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Basic security foundation of RSA

Theorem

If the Problem 1 (integer factorization) is solved, Problem 2 (RSA) can also be solved.

- It is suspected, but not proved, that Problem 2 may be easier than Problem 1. (Boneh and Venkatesan)
- Thus, breaking RSA may be easier than solving integer factorization.

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 RSA is considered very secure and has been widely used, such as in data transmission, digital signature and private key exchange.

Advantages and limitations

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Common uses of RSA

 RSA is considered very secure and has been widely used, such as in data transmission, digital signature and private key exchange.

Advantages and limitations

- **High security:** Provides strong security through the use of large keys and complex mathematical operations.
- Computational intensity: High computational demand because of the high-digit prime numbers, and the complex operations.

Security of RSA

Implementation of RSA 000

Considerations for quantum computing

Impact of quantum computing on RSA



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Security of RSA

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 Quantum computing could produce more efficient algorithms that break RSA.



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Security of RSA

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- Quantum computing could produce more efficient algorithms that break RSA.
- For example, Shor's algorithm is a quantum algorithm that solves integer factorization efficiently.

Security of RSA

Implementation of RSA 000

Considerations for quantum computing

Impact of quantum computing on RSA

- Quantum computing could produce more efficient algorithms that break RSA.
- For example, Shor's algorithm is a quantum algorithm that solves integer factorization efficiently.
- For now, we cannot build sufficiently sophisticated quantum computers that execute these complex algorithms.

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Implementation of RSA

Finding prime numbers

RSA demonstration

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Finding prime numbers for RSA

Selecting primes p and q

The security of RSA relies heavily on the choice of the two large prime numbers p and q. These primes should be:



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Large enough to avoid trivial factorization;

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- Large enough to avoid trivial factorization;
- Randomly selected;

Finding prime numbers for RSA

Selecting primes p and q

The security of RSA relies heavily on the choice of the two large prime numbers p and q. These primes should be:

- Large enough to avoid trivial factorization;
- Randomly selected;
- Not too close to each other to prevent Fermat's factorization attack.

Finding prime numbers for RSA

Primality testing

Primality testing is crucial for verifying if a randomly generated number is prime.

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Finding prime numbers for RSA

Primality testing

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 Probabilistic tests, like Miller-Rabin test, provide a high degree of certainty.

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Finding prime numbers for RSA

Primality testing

Primality testing is crucial for verifying if a randomly generated number is prime.

- Probabilistic tests, like Miller-Rabin test, provide a high degree of certainty.
- Deterministic tests, like AKS, are used for conclusive results but are less efficient.

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RSA demonstration

Python implementation example

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